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Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: 
Is Mercy Sufficient? 
by 
The Reverend John F. Tuohey, Ph.D. 
Father Tuohey is Assistant Professor/Moral Theology at the Catholic University 
of America, Washington, DC. 
One of the most persuasive arguments for assisted suicide and euthanasia is 
made from the perspective of mercy. Brock has argued that it should be the 
evaluation of this motive, not the structure of the act, that determines the ethical 
appropriateness of assisted suicide. I Duntley argues that in a covenantal 
physician/patient relationship, assisted suicide can be an experience of mercy 
and grace.2 Two recently published articles likewise appeal to mercy. Quill et al 
describe both euthanasia and assisted suicide as humane,3 while Brody describes 
both euthanasia and assisted suicide as an extraordinary act of compassion.4 
As compelling as the argument from motive is, and even opponents agree that 
it is the most compelling,S one must ask if it is sufficient. Is it sufficient that human 
acts in general, and medical acts in this situation, be motivated by mercy? I 
suggest that the answer is no. I take this position for three reasons, which I will 
develop briefly here. First, the ethical tradition that calls for mercy has never 
suggested that it is, by itself, sufficient to judge the appropriateness of human acts. 
Second, the criteria for determining those situations in which assisting in 
another's suicide or engaging in an act of euthanasia is said to be merciful is 
impossible to define with precision. Third, only by examining one's intention can 
a judgement be made about the appropriateness of what may appear to be a 
merciful act in a hopeless situation. 
The Place of Motive in Ethics 
The foundation for acting out of mercy can be traced back through Joseph 
Fletcher6 to the Augustinian maxim: "Love, and do what you will." In its original 
form, the maxim is not rendered Ama, et quod vis fac; "Love with desire or 
empathy, and do what you will." Rather, Augustine wrote Diligg, et quod vis 
fac;7 "Love carefully, and do what you will." By choosing the Latin diligere, 
Augustine taught that one must love carefully and reasonably. Fletcher grounds 
his situation ethics in the notion that one should love with calculation. It is not 
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sufficient to love with desire or empathy. One must love with reason and care. 
This qualification is important. Acting with mercy is not always easy, and can 
become more difficult in different situations. Fatigue is just one impediment to 
certainty in acting according to motives. Desperation and fear are others. To judge 
euthanasia and assisted suicide on the basis of mercy presumes that human motives 
can be pure and objective. That is, it presumes that we can be free from the undue 
influence of fatigue and fear, which can color our judgements, when it may be 
fatigue and fear, not objective facts, that cause us to judge a situation to be 
hopeless. It also presumes that we can sort through the many contradictory 
emotions, such as love and anger, loss and relief, that are part of grief. Human 
experience witnesses to the fact that human motives are rarely, if ever, pure and 
objective. For that reason, the ethical tradition to which we subscribe, even the 
situation ethics description ofthat tradition, has insisted on tempering motives. We 
are to act not only out of mercy, but with mercy that is reasonable and careful. 
Hopelessness As a Reason for Mercy 
It is not uncommon in the literature to refer to some persons as being 
hopelessly illN,tO Writers who hold that mercy is a sufficient basis upon which to 
justify assisted suicide and euthanasia often appeal to this hopelessness as a 
justification.J,4,11,12 If it is hopelessness that justifies these extraordinary acts of 
mercy, certain questions must be addressed: Does hopelessness constitute a 
medical reality, like futility, or is it a state of mind? Does the term denote an 
objective reality, or is it a subjective perception? 
Let us suppose for a moment that hopelessness is an objective reality. By what 
criteria is it to be judged as existing? Studies suggest that clinical assessments in 
estimating prognosisl3 and diagnosisl4 are limited. Are we to assume that the 
ability to estimate hope, which is often rooted in these judgements, is any less 
limited? It has also been shown that physicians have a tendency to remember the 
unusual and bizarre case. This memory predisposes healthcare workers to make 
decisions on the basis of those few cases, which may not reflect the physicians' 
overall experience.15 It is legitimate to question the extent to which the memory 
of a particularly heart wrenching case will predispose healthcare workers to 
judge similar cases as hopeless. 
Schneiderman et al. reject this idea of hopeless as an objective reality.16 In 
contrasting it from what they define as the objective notion of futility, they 
describe hopelessness as a subjective attitude. If they are correct, it would mean 
that hopelessness is more difficult to determine than futility. That this is 
somewhat troublesome can be seen in the fact that the notion of futility is itself 
nearly impossible to define. The bioethical literature speaks, for example, of 
"virtual,"10 "quantitative and qualitative,"13 and "physiologic"17 futility. Are we 
to speak also of virtual, quantitative, qualitative and physiologic hopelessness? 
Cases of euthanasia, which could conceivably find their way to court, would 
probably show as wide a range of rulings on hopelessness as are presently found 
on futility. IS It is difficult to see how assisted suicide and euthanasia can be a 
careful and reasoned expression of mercy when the criteria used to determine the 
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hopelessness of the case which allows for such extraordinary acts of mercy are so 
difficult to determine. 
The Place of Intention in Ethics 
For mercy to be careful and reasoned, it must be more than an empathetic 
response to a desperate situation. The only way to be certain that mercy is careful 
and reasoned is to examine human intentions. One's intention, as distinct from 
one's motive or rational for acting, is the judgement made about one's ultimate 
goal, and the means used to achieve that goa\. Intention does not depend on 
motives or subjective attitudes. It speaks of the decision or judgement an 
individual has made about means and ends. 
As humans, we cannot always control or be free of the undue influence of our 
emotions. There will always be times when we will not feel merciful, yet know 
we must act on another's behalf. There will be times when the apparent 
hopelessness of a situation will move us profoundly to want to act even when we 
know that, in this particular case, it is more prudent to do nothing. Human 
emotions, out of which motives often emerge, can be deceptive. This is illustrated 
clearly in the anguish of physicians trying to act ethically in difficult sutiations. 19 
What we can control is the judgement of how to respond to these situations . 
Whether or not we are motivated by mercy, whether or not we perceive a 
situation as hopeless, we can make a judgement about the correct action to take by 
examining goals and the means to achieve them. We will know we are being 
merciful in a careful and reasoned way when we form an intention that seeks to 
protect and promote a human good as its end and in the means. 
Our society holds that life is a good. When that good is threatened by some 
pathology or trauma, medicine seeks to protect and promote it through 
prophylactic, diagnostic, therapeutic, prosthetic and palliative interventions. 
Medicine intends the good of life as a goal, and uses means to attain that goal 
which protect and promote that good. 
This may sound to some like vitalism. It is not, and it is wrong to suggest that 
the ethical tradition holds that the mere preservation of physical existence is 
necessary for promoting life as a good. Whereas the good oflife is to be protected 
and promoted, it need not always be realized. There is no reason why life-
sustaining medical interventions cannot be foregone for a patient for whom they 
are of no benefit, as there is no obligation to realize the good oflife at all costs. The 
realization of any good needs to be balanced against the burdens endured to 
ensure that realization. When the burdens are disproportionate, or there is no 
benefit to be gained, medical interventions are foregone, even when death will 
result. This is referred to ethically as "allowing to die." The judgement is made 
that, while life is a good, some medical interventions are no longer of value to that 
life. 
Although promoting and protecting a good does not mean that it must always 
be realized, it does mean that the good should not be directly attacked. That is, we 
ought not intend to destroy a good, either as a goal or as means to a goa\. Life is a 
good to be promoted and protected, even if not always realized. We should not 
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intend to attack that good, either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. To 
intend to end another's life, euthanasia, because his or her situation is hopeless 
may be motivated by mercy, but it is not careful or reasoned. To intend to 
cooperate in another's attempt to end that other's own life, assisted suicide, as a 
way of relieving pain and suffering may also be motivated by mercy. Like. 
euthanasia, it is not careful or reasoned. Mercy is not careful or reasonable when 
it attacks a good as a means or as an end. 
Whatever our motives, we can be sure that we are acting in a careful and 
reasoned way when we intend to promote and protect the good of life, or when 
we make a judgement that the burdens of continuing to realize that good are 
disproportionate to the benefits. Whatever our motives, we can be sure that we 
are not acting in a careful and reasoned way when we attack the good of life. 
Conclusion 
Quill et al. begin their article by describing several moving "predicaments 
[that] do not fall into simple diagnostic categories."3 They then outline a carefully 
reasoned procedure for a merciful response. Yet, the question is not whether the 
procedure to be followed for euthanasia or assisted suicide is carefully reasoned, 
but whether euthanasia or assisted suicide are careful and reasoned. 
Simple mercy cannot, it seems to me, navigate society and medicine through 
the criteria needed to define what is and is not hopeless, what constitutes 
sufficient hopelessness, and who ought to receive assistance in suicide or 
euthanasia. We deceive ourselves if we think it can. Terminal illness and 
desperate situations require a careful and reasoned reflection on how to protect 
and promote the good of human life. If, as a society and a medical profession, we 
hold that life is a human good, then we ought always to intend to promote and 
protect that good, even in the face of medical failure.4 We need not always realize 
that good, and often we ought to stop trying to do so long before some of these 
desperate situations arise.20 But, we ought never intend to attack that good. 
However sincere our motives, they are not sufficient. We need always to intend 
good, both as our goal and our means to achieve that goal, if we are to be truly 
merciful. 
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